BETWEEN “UNWANTED” AND “DESIRED” POPULATIONS: COMPARING CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION POLICIES OF BULGARIA, GREECE, AND TURKEY

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Abstract
The concept of post-socialism evolved into an “area study” while its “era” content became mostly excluded from the discourse. This paper discusses the necessity of integrative approach in post-socialist studies to understand the phenomenon in depth. It offers a comparative study of the post-socialist period through the EU trajectories of the three neighboring states: Bulgaria (2007), Greece (1981), and Turkey (candidate since 1999). Comparative studies mostly dealt with intra-post-socialist states. State-socialist regimes’ differences from their capitalist neighbors are mentioned, but usually not included in comparative studies. I argue that by compartmentalization under the label of post-socialism, we miss the similarities that transcend state systems of capitalism and socialism. I argue that one of the fundamental similarities between former state socialist countries and their “capitalist” neighbors is migration and citizenship regimes driven by nationalism and their politics of “unwanted” vs. “desired” populations. While the influx of refugees is currently at primary agenda of the EU politics, migration and refugees were also among the concerns of the post-socialist era in the 1990s. Post-socialist migrations had various motives, such as refugees from civil wars as in the case of former Yugoslavia, asylum seekers from destabilized post-socialist regions, and economically motivated emigrants. Through examples from Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey, this paper analyzes the three countries’ socio-political trajectories as well as migration and citizenship policies. I evaluate migration of the “co-ethnics” and citizenship policies in the three countries, and show how similar their motives are, how they are interrelated with each other, and finally with the dissolution of state-socialist regimes and the growth of the EU,
how they produce similar effects. I argue that the EU could neither change nor even challenge the politics and discourse of “unwanted” vs. “desired” populations in the three states.

**Keywords:** Post-socialism, EU, Balkans, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, migration, citizenship.

1. Introduction

For quite some time, compartmentalization and disciplinization in social sciences have been a desirable process. It has been advocated that compartmentalization and disciplinization would diversify research topics and at the same time facilitate better focus. For example, linguistics divided into sub-disciplines of socio-linguistics and anthropological linguistics, and while the former still maintains a relation with sociology, the latter use the techniques of linguistic anthropology. Another compartmentalization occurred in the development of “umbrella” organizations such as those for “area studies:” as Asian Studies, Latin American Studies, East European Studies, and the like. Area studies can help to re-organize dispersed disciplines with similar geographical focuses. Thus, archaeologist and political scientists working in the same world region can perhaps find a common ground. However, eventually the criticism regarding the alienation of area studies' scholars from one another's works. For instance, Latin Americanists and East Europeanists, even though they were studying similar concepts, were not aware of each other's works.

The end of state socialist regimes in Eastern Europe opened a discussion as to how to adapt them to the “democratic” and “free market” system. Later it continued with an attempt to understand why state-socialist regimes collapsed, by trying to understand how the dynamics of the state-socialist regimes differed from capitalist economies. These discussions were fruitful in an anthropological manner extracting important clues to understanding these societies. We can see from various studies that Eastern European state-socialist regimes had their different, but at the same time similar, trajectories and systems (Verdery, 1991; Creed, 1995; Kideckel, 1982; Seleny, 1995). Therefore, comparative studies mostly dealt with intra-post-socialist states. State-socialist regimes’ differences from their capitalist neighbors are mentioned, but usually not included in comparative studies. I argue that by compartmentalization under the label of post-socialism, we miss the similarities that transcend state systems of capitalism and socialism. I argue that one of the fundamental similarities between former state social list countries and their “capitalist” neighbors is migration and citizenship regimes driven by nationalism and their politics of “unwanted” vs. “desired” populations.
Although contemporary support and opposition against the EU have an important economic character, such as expectations or frustrations over employment/unemployment, the idea of Europe is utilized as a “civilizational discourse” (Brown 2008) in which Europe is imagined as “civilized” (Todorova 1997). It does not apply only to the former state-socialist countries, but also to the Southern European countries, such as Greece (Herzfeld, 1997) and Turkey (İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı, 2015). Following the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974, Greece applied to the full membership, and after six years of negotiations, the country has become the first Southeastern country to join the EU. Although Turkey applied for the full membership in 1987, it was not until 1999 it has become an official candidate, and it was not until 2005 the accession negotiations has started. The country is currently under the close radar of the EU following the recent backlash in human and minority rights especially since the Istanbul Gezi Park Protests in 2013 (Polat 2016; Haksöz, 2015). Bulgaria is the only former state-socialist country among the three countries. It applied for the EU membership in 1995 and was granted only in 2007 together with Romania, three years after the first Eastern European Enlargement in 2004. One of the most important components of the EU integration process is human and minority rights. Minority rights were among the most important criteria of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993. Despite various EU legal documents, not only among the 2004 and 2007 accession but there are also problems in previous accession countries implementing the policies and everyday practices on minority-majority relations.

In this paper, I discuss the necessity of being inclusive in post-socialist studies with the examples of Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. To do this, I chose two recent phenomena: migration and citizenship policies. My aim is first to show how these countries’ socio-political trajectories are interrelated and how it is problematic to exclude them by labeling only some of them a part of post-socialist studies. My other goal is to provide an overall analysis of migration and citizenship policies in the case of three examples from the post-socialist Balkans from the EU perspective. First, I evaluate the “co-ethnics” migrations in the three countries, and show (a) how their motives are similar, (b) how they are closely related to the dissolution of state-socialism and (c) how they produce similar effects in three countries regardless whether they were state-socialist or not. Secondly, I discuss the politics of citizenship in the three countries by taking examples of Kurds in Turkey, Macedonians in Greece, and Pomaks in Bulgaria. I show how their pre-1989 and post-1989 citizenship politics are similar, and still under the influence of the nationalism and building a homogeneous nation.
2. Post-1989 In-Migrations of Co-Ethnic Populations:

One of the most obvious consequences of the dissolution of the state socialist regimes in 1989 in every sphere of life and politics is probably migration flows. Those who are not much familiar with Greece may expect that migration in the 1990s was from developing countries of Asia, Middle East, and Africa. However, the country was the primary destination of “ethnic Greeks” from former Soviet Union countries and Albania. Alternatively, in the case of Turkey, one may be familiar with migrations of 350,000 “ethnic Turks” from Bulgaria, or with country's geopolitical position as a transit country of “illegal” emigrants on their way to the EU. However, Turkey itself has been also a destination for many emigrants, such as post-1989 ethnic Turks from Bulgaria, Western Thrace of Greece, and Meshketian Turks, who were deported during the Stalin regime from their homelands in Georgia, as well as ethnic Georgians and even Armenians whose country does not have diplomatic relations with Turkey. One can also remember migration of ethnic Turks in 1989 from Bulgaria and later “illegal” migration many other Bulgarian citizens to the EU countries, but may not know that Bulgaria also receives “ethnic Bulgarians” immigrants from former Soviet Union countries and Macedonia.

Following the fall of the state socialism, one of the interestingly common features of the three countries was migration flows of their co-ethnic groups or expatriates. This was a result of restriction of the free movement of people during state-socialism, but at the same time also resulted from an incomplete or ongoing process of nation formation. All three countries have nation building, and nation-state formation trajectories, which include ethnic cleansing via forced or “encouraged” in, and out-migration flows. Their national identity formation was also exclusionary and assimilatory. Bulgaria since its formation tried to assimilate Pomaks and Turks (Eminov, 1997, 76-117), Greece used extensive assimilatory policies on Macedonians (Karakasidou, 1997, pp. 162-189), and Turkey struggled to assimilate its Kurdish population (Yeğen, 2007; 2009). I discuss how selective acceptance of immigrant populations, or “privileging one group's return” (Voutira, 2004) based on their ethnic identity is part of the ongoing “nation formation” process via “ethnic homogenization” (Özgür-Baklacioglu, 2006). Thus, the three countries are not that different regarding their “ethnic homogenization” aspirations even though only Bulgaria experienced state socialism and is the only “post-socialist country” among the three countries.

2.1. Ethnic Turks of Bulgaria to Turkey

Bulgaria before its independence in 1878, included Muslim and Bulgarian populations in relatively close numbers (Karpat, 2004, pp. 315-356;
McCarthy, 1995, pp. 89-91). As a result of the Ottoman sürgün policies, rebel or disputed Turcoman, Kurdish and Arab tribes were relocated by force to the Balkans (Tekeli, 1994, pp. 204-205). Today, Muslims constitute 10% and Turks 8.8% of Bulgaria’s population (National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, 2011). This dramatic decline of Muslim populations was partly due to massacres and deaths during the wars between 1877 and 1912 as well as waves of migrations following Bulgaria's independence from the Ottoman Empire.

In 1984, Bulgaria started a “forced assimilation” campaign or so-called “revival process” against the Turkish minority. At the end of the year 1985, personal names of the Turks were forcibly changed into Bulgarian-Christian ones. All uses of Turkish, either in private or public spheres, media, books, schools, were prohibited. As a result, in the spring of 1989 Turks organized mass demonstrations and protests to demand their cultural and minority rights (Eminov, 1997, pp. 91-98). In the summer of 1989, after the opening of the Bulgarian-Turkish border, Turks started to flee the country en masse. The number of refugees exceeded 350,000 by August 1989. However, with the dissolution of the state socialism in November 1989, by the end of 1991, 120,000 of them returned to Bulgaria (Zhelyazkova, 1998).

As a demographic fact, migration flows of minorities from Bulgaria have continued in the post-socialist period. One of the major historical destinations of the Turkish minority has been Turkey, where they can handle the stress of migration in part by sharing the same language. Even though Turkish dialects spoken in Bulgaria are quite different than the official dialect spoken in Turkey, and local dialects are stigmatized in Turkish major urban centers (Karlık and Akbarov, 2015), Turkish emigrants from Bulgaria can switch relatively easily the official dialect. Many of those who had returned in 1991 searched opportunities to emigrate again either as undocumented migrants as overstaying with their tourist visas or by illegally crossing the border. By some sources, their numbers are estimated to be 30,000 per annum and during 1990-97 approximately 210,000 Turks left Bulgaria (Höpken, 1997).

In 2001, Turkey lifted visa restrictions for Bulgarian citizens. Due to the comparatively more hospitable linguistic landscape, in 2005, the number of Turkish 'undocumented workers' from Bulgaria to Turkey exceeded those to the Western European countries (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2005). Therefore, the Turkish and Bulgarian governments of the time signed a new visa regulation in which Bulgarian citizens are now able to stay only for three months per six-month period, which dramatically affected the Turkish emigrants from Bulgaria. After that, the emigrants started to focus more on Western European countries. It can also be argued that Turkey has served as a
'buffer zone' or 'training zone' for Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria before they gain skills and experiences to move to countries with more different social and linguistic landscapes. Between 1990 and 2005 naturalization applications for Turkish citizenship of 272,647 ethnic Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria were accepted. 225,353 of them were accepted according to Turkish Settlement Law 2510, in which immigrants of Turkish origin have a right to obtain Turkish citizenship much easier, and 47,394 of a total 60,492 applications were accepted according to the Turkish Citizenship Law 403. According to this law, one can receive Turkish citizenship under the same conditions regardless of their ethnic origin (Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 2005, 184-190).

There are two key agencies that play a major role in Turkey’s policy on ethnic Turks abroad. TİKA (Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency) mainly supports infrastructure and cultural projects of “ethnic Turks” abroad. In 2010, Turkey established a new institution Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı (The Turks and Kin Groups Living Abroad Directorate) which coordinates relationships with “the Turks abroad.” Unlike the Greek and Bulgarian examples, however, this institution covers both ethnic-Turks who are not citizens of Turkey and Turkish citizens or Turkish emigrants living abroad (The Turks and Kin Groups Living Abroad Directorate, n.d.).

2.2. Ethnic Greeks’ Migration from Albania and Former Soviet Republics to Greece

Greece signed population exchange agreements with Bulgaria and Turkey after the First World War. Thus, ethnic Greeks from Turkey and Bulgaria resettled in places in Greece, which had been previously occupied by ethnic Bulgarians or Muslims. Albania also has a substantial number of Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox people, especially in its southern border regions. According to the Census of 1989, there were around 60,000 ethnic Greeks in Albania which constituted 1.8 percent of the population of the country (Kosta 2004, pp. 231-239). While according to the Census of 2011, Albanian citizens of Greek origin dropped to 25,000, which is 0.9 percent of the whole population (Erebara, 2013). In the post-1989 period, ethnic Greeks from Albania started to migrate to Greece in large numbers. As in cases of Bulgaria and Turkey, Greece also has special citizenship legislations for ethnic-Greeks. According to the Citizenship Law of Greece, ethnic Greeks can acquire Greek citizenship easier than people who are not ethnic Greeks. There is a “General Secretariat for Repatriated Co-ethnicis (homogeneis)” who regulates and monitors their repatriation process.

In addition to ethnic Greeks from Albania, Greece received migrations
from former Soviet socialist republics following the dissolution of USSR in 1991. Ethnic Greeks in former Soviet republics used to live mostly in southern Russia, Georgia, Crimea, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Diamanti-Karanou, 2004). Until 1999, most of them entered the country with “repatriation visas,” but after the visa procedures were tightened most of them started to use “tourist visas” (Voutira, 2004, pp. 533-544). According to official statistics, in 2008, there were 189,000 co-ethnics holding “Special Identity Cards (EDTO)” which were issued to Albanian citizens (Voreioepirotex) with Greek ethnicity and 154,000 Greek citizens “repatriated” from former Soviet Union countries (Triandafyllidou, 2008). Repatriated ethnic Greeks mostly resettled in northeastern regions, such as Thrace and Greek Macedonia, where some of Greece's minorities live, such as Macedonians, Turks, Pomaks and Roma. However, interestingly these ethnic Greeks prefer to call themselves ‘refugees’ (prophyges) rather than ‘repatriates’ (palinnoostoundes) or ‘returnees’ (epanapatrizomenoi), as various Greek state authorities prefer to use. The government has offered them subsidized housing, access to language training programs and social services, which are not available for non-co-ethnics (Voutira, 2004, pp. 533-544).

2.3. Ethnic Bulgarians from Macedonia and Moldova to Bulgaria

Similar to the Greek and Turkish Citizenship Laws, the Bulgarian Citizenship Law as amended in 1998 differentiates between “Bulgarians” or ethnic Bulgarians, and “Bulgarian citizens.” According to the logic of the law, “Bulgarians” who are not “Bulgarian citizens” are still considered as “Bulgarians” even though they are citizens of other states. Their naturalization procedures are also simpler than those of the “non-ethnic-Bulgarians” (Smilov and Jileva, 2010). Bulgaria also has a “State Agency for Bulgarians Abroad,” whose interest and focus does not include non-ethnic Bulgarians even if they are Bulgarian citizens, such as, Bulgarian citizens of Turkish ethnicity in Turkey. The “Law on Bulgarians Living outside of Republic Bulgaria 2010” regulates their status and how they can prove their citizenships. According to the last census of the USSR in 1989, there were 233,000 ethnic Bulgarian in Ukraine, 89,000 in Moldova, 33,000 in Russia and 16,000 in Central Asia (Iordanova, 1993, pp. 17-18).

As a result of the amendments to the Citizenship Law, there was an increase in applications on the grounds of being “ethnic Bulgarian” after 2001. With the 2001 amendments, language competency requirements and obligations of commitment to hold only Bulgarian citizenship for “ethnic Bulgarians” have been lifted (Smilov and Jileva, 2010). In other words, they can hold their birthplace citizenships together with their new Bulgarian citizenships. Thus, between 2000 and 2006, 90 percent of naturalization
applications, were on the grounds of being “ethnic Bulgarian.” Out of total 87,722 applications 32,702 of them were Macedonian\(^1\) and 38,641 Moldavian citizens. Among them, 10,850 “ethnic Bulgarian” Macedonian citizens and 9,187 Moldavian citizens naturalized into Bulgarian citizenship (Smilov and Jileva, 2010). There were also less than 700 from Israeli, Ukrainian, Serbian, and Russian citizens who gained Bulgarian citizenship in this period. The number of applications which were still in the process of evaluation had reached 60,000 in 2007 when Bulgaria became a member of the EU. The reason for low application numbers from Ukraine, where it is estimated that there are 235,000 ethnic Bulgarians, is probably a result of Ukrainian citizenship law, which prohibits multiple citizenships (Smilev and Jileva, 2010). On the other hand, Bulgarian state and political parties problematize dual citizenships of ethnic Turks from Turkey, who by birth have Bulgarian citizenship, but not those of newly naturalized “ethnic Bulgarians” from Macedonia or Moldova. This is mainly the result of the populist scapegoating discourse of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria in Turkey who are said to vote only for the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a political party which is constituted mainly by Turks, Pomaks and Roma (Özgür-Baklacioglu, 2006; Novinite.com, 2009b; 2010). Bulgaria similar to Greece and Turkey has developed policies in attempt to resettle its “ethnic Bulgarian” immigrant in the minority regions to reshape those regions' demographic structure (Guentcheva, Kabakchieva and Kolarski, 2003).

3. Politics towards “Desired” and “Unwanted” Populations in the Post-socialist Balkans

In addition to migration policies based on ethnic, linguistic and religious preferences, all the three states also implemented citizenship policies in order to construct nation-states with “ideal citizens.” The idea of construction of ideal citizens and nation-state has a long history and certainly not a new phenomenon nor exclusive only to the three countries. Such constructing “ideal citizens” policies are hierarchical and eventually results in “unwanted” populations. Those unwanted populations were those who the states' ideologies assumed could not be turned into 'ideal citizens' with states' ideological socialization apparatuses, in other words, could be assimilated. In all the three states, the major criterion to be an 'ideal citizen' has been religion. Thus, one should be Muslim to be considered ideal citizen in Turkey, and Christian Orthodox in Bulgaria and Greece. However, even the religion has

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\(^1\) One of the interesting examples of naturalization into Bulgarian citizenship is the former Macedonian Prime Minister Ljubcho Georgievski. Georgievski was the Macedonian Prime Minister between 1998 and 2002, and later in 2006 received a Bulgarian citizenship (Macedonian News 2006).
not been enough by itself. Ideal citizens should have all the 'qualities' regarding religion, ethnic identity, and language. In this part, I will discuss such policies which aim to create “ideal citizens” in Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. I will investigate the three states' treatment of some of their minorities and their policies to turn “unwanted” populations into “ideal” ones.

3.1. Bulgaria’s so-called “Bulgarian Mohammedans”

Pomaks are Slavophone people who converted to Islam during the Ottoman Empire and live mainly in the Rhodope Mountains region of Bulgaria. There are also Pomak communities outside Bulgaria especially in the Western Thrace of Greece and the Marmara region of Turkey. In Bulgaria, Pomaks faced forced name changes and forced religious conversions or “re-conversions” since the end of the Balkan Wars in the 1910s (Neuburger, 2004, pp. 75, 99, 148-153). Pomaks share the majority language but not the religion with Christian Orthodox ethnic Bulgarians. Bulgarian nationalist practices tries to assimilate Pomaks by converting them to their “real” or “true” religions, Christian Orthodoxy. Stigmatization of being Muslim and Turk, which together are associated with the “five hundred years Ottoman yoke\(^2\)” contributes to the marginalization of Pomaks in Bulgaria. There were forced name-changing campaigns against the Pomaks in 1912, 1936, 1972, and 1984 in which Muslim Pomaks’ names were changed with Christian-Bulgarian names (Neuburger, 2004). Many Pomak people born or living during those years carry two names: an official Christian or Bulgarian name that they use for official purposes, and Muslim name that they use in their private lives. Having Christian-Bulgarian personal names certainly helped them to dissimulate and manage their visibilities against possible discrimination in the public spheres, such as at work, school, and government offices (Sözer, 2014, pp. 137-177; Inter Ethnic Initiative for Human Rights Foundation, 2003; Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2001; 2002). In other words, they kept but hid their Pomak identities or mimicked the majority ethnic Bulgarian identity without actually being assimilated into it.

It is not known how many people self-declared themselves as Pomaks because there is no option to declare as Pomak in the censuses. They have to register as Bulgarian by ethnicity and Muslim in faith. This formulation may work for some of them, but some opt to declare themselves as “Pomaks.” For example, Smolyan, one of the regions where Pomaks live, has the highest rate of people who opted not to declare their religion in the 2001 Census. Around 39,000 people who constitute 28 percent of the whole population of Smolyan

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2 Bulgarian nationalist historiography exclusively uses the term “robstvo” which literally means “slavery.” Only in the last decades more neutral terms, such as “Ottoman presence” or “Ottoman rule” started to be used.
region did not declare their religious affiliation (National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria 2001). Similarly, in the Census of 1992, 35,000 Pomaks in the Blagoevgrad region registered themselves as “Turks.” That opened a hot public debate, and it resulted in the nullification of the census results of the region not by the National Statistical Institute but by the Bulgarian Parliament in 1993 (Eminov, 1997, p. 111). This is may have been to escape the stigma of being Muslim, in a place where “patriots versus traitors” discourse based on religion is still prevalent both in everyday life and politics (Georgieva, 2001; Mancheva, 2001). This action on the part of the Pomaks in the region opened a heated public debate, and resulted in the nullification of the census results of the region not by the National Statistical Institute but by the Bulgarian Parliament in 1993 (Eminov, 1997, p. 111).

Although Pomaks are recognized neither as having a distinctive ethnic identity nor distinctive language by the Bulgarian state, some Pomaks do identify themselves as a distinctive ethnic group with distinctive language: “Pomashki” (Haksöz, 2016). There are also some especially among the older generation Pomaks who prefer to call themselves as “Ahriyani.” Bulgaria’s strategy is to stress that Pomaks are ethnic Bulgarians who speak the Bulgarian language but having Muslim faith. Since the 1930s the government has tried to construct a new identity: “Bulgaro-Mohammedans.” This new identity was followed by “voluntary” name-changing campaigns in which it is reported that up to 1944 around 75,000 Pomaks changed their Muslim names to Christian-Bulgarian ones (Agentsiya Fokus, 2011). Currently using the term “Bulgarian Muslim” to refer Pomaks is more common, except within some right-wing and nationalist circles where people still insist on calling the group “Bulgaro Mohammedans.” In the western social science literature, the seemingly more neutral term “Bulgarian-speaking Muslims” is widely preferred (Lubanska, 2015).

Pomaks in Bulgaria are not organized under any “Pomak political party.” They usually vote for mainstream political parties as well the MRF (Movement for Rights and Freedoms), a party consisting of mostly ethnic Turks of Bulgaria, and other Muslim groups, such as Pomaks and Roma (Myuhtar, 2015). Bulgarian right-wing circles accuse MRF of “assimilating” Pomaks into Turkishness (Kulov, 2011, pp. 208-212). Because of the institutional pressure that still considers Pomaks as a group that can be assimilated into the ethno-national Bulgarian identity, most of the Pomaks abstain from being visible in the institutional sphere as Pomaks or using local

3According to Edward Said (1979, p. 230), the term “Mohammedan” is orientalist. The term “Mohammedan” assumes the Muslims have a similar conceptualization of the Prophet Muhammed as in the dominant Christianity theological understanding in which Jesus Christ is the son of the God.
Rhodopean identity as a non-ethnic and non-religious identity. This changed some when, in October 2012, an association with “Pomak” in its name is founded in Bulgaria. “European Institute ‘Pomak’” immediately received negative criticism from the Bulgarian media and politicians (Haksöz, 2016).

3.2. Greece's “Slavic-Speaking Greeks”

After, the Treaty of Berlin that created the country of Bulgaria, another issue had emerged: “the Macedonian question.” According to the Ottoman millet system, no matter what their ethnic identity, Christian Orthodox Ottoman subjects were governed by the Greek Orthodox patriarch based in Istanbul. In the second half of the 19th century, with the rise of the nationalism in the Balkans, non-Greek Christian Orthodox subjects started to mobilize for establishing their separate churches. The ethnicity problem of Macedonia started when the Ottoman Sultan Abdülaziz gave permission for establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870. The Greek Patriarch opposed to this and did not recognize the Bulgarian Exarchate. Finally, in 1872, the Patriarchate declared the Exarchate schismatic and its adherents excommunicated (Jelavich, 1993a, pp. 344-345). After the establishment of Bulgarian principality in 1878, the new struggle was for control and domination of the Macedonia region. The Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian churches were active in the region and tried to convince Christian Orthodox populations to join their respective churches. Ethnic identity became totally associated with the church to which a person was registered (Jelavich, 1993b, pp. 89-95). This created instances of different members of the same family being Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian Orthodox (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993). After the reinstitution of the Ottoman parliament and the constitution in 1908 with the Young Turks Revolution, there were around 250 Bulgarian, Greek, Serb and Vlach\(^4\) bandit groups who were fighting with each other also trying to force people to join their respective churches (Sencer, 2004). As a consequence of pressures from these armed groups, one day a village could become Bulgarian and another day Greek (E.H.W., 1945, pp. 509-515; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1913). Primary fights were between the patriarchist Greek and exarchist Bulgarian bands (Jelavich, 1993b, pp. 89-95; Roucek, 1947). Agnew (2007, p. 405) defines this situation as “the fluidity of ethnicity with its complex relationship to kinship, class, trading, religion, and attachment to place in a region where many people were multilingual.”

At the end of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, Greece took control of Aegean Macedonia together with the region's Slavophone population. Since then, the

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\(^4\)Vlachs are community in the Balkans who speaks a dialect of Romanian.
state has extended its assimilation apparatus first, via forcing the population to revert to Patriarchate and second, via compulsory education in the Greek language. The Greek state's assimilation agenda was to assimilate non-Greek but Christian Orthodox groups such as Albanians, Vlach, and Macedonians (Agnew, 2007), but not non-Christian populations, such as Muslims. After the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey and Greece agreed to implement population exchanges as Bulgaria and Greece had done before (Dragostinova, 2011, pp. 117-156). As a result, Muslims from Greek Macedonia and other parts, except the Western Thrace, were exchanged with the Greek-speaking population of Anatolia except those who were living in Istanbul and two Turkish Aegean islands Tenedos (Bozcaada) and Imroz (Gökçeada) (Aktar, 2000, pp. 17-70). Among the exchanged population from Greek Macedonia were mainly Slavic-speaking Muslims, though Greek speaking ones were also included. From the Turkish side, together with the Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox population, the Turkish-speaking Christian Orthodox Karamanlis were also exchanged (Birtek, 2005). The population exchange was based on religious affiliation, or the Ottoman millet system and not on ethnic or linguistic identities (Aktar, 2000). With the population exchange agreements, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey exchanged their “unwanted” or “cannot-be-assimilated” populations with populations that can be assimilated and turn into “ideal citizens” (Yeğen, 2009).

After the Greek Civil War in the 1940s and following years being Slavophone was associated with the “communist-enemies,” either Bulgarian or Yugoslavian (Agnew, 2007). In order to deal with these “unwanted” people, Article 19 of the 1955 Greek Nationality Law was put into practice. According to the law, when citizens of non-Greek ethnic origin (allogenis) who left the country and there is “strong” belief that they would not return, their Greek citizenships could be revoked. Between 1955 and 1998 when the article is finally repealed, around 60.000 people lost their Greek citizenship status. Around 47.000 of them were ethnic Turks and Pomaks from Western Thrace, which became the target of the law after the confrontation between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus issue in the 1960s (Onar and Ö zgüneş, 2010).

Today, it is estimated that there are between 10.000 and 50.000 ethnic Macedonian in Greece. Some of them emigrated to other EU countries, USA and Australia. Some of them stopped identifying themselves as Macedonians as a result of inter-group marriages between Macedonian and Greek speakers (Angelopoulos, 2004; Agnew, 2007; Karakasidou, 1997). Although there were some attempts to revive Macedonian ethnic identity in Greece via the Macedonian Rainbow party in post-1989, the party was not able to mobilize Macedonian speakers and received only 0.1 percent of the votes in the general elections in 1996, and European Parliament elections in 1994 and 1999.
(Angelopoulos, 2004). However, these low percentages are also direct results of the Greek election system which, like that in Turkey, is designed to prevent minority parties' representation. For example, the Greek election system has three percent election threshold not only for political parties but also for independent candidates (Tsitselikis, 2004), which makes it practically impossible to be elected as an independent candidate.

3.3. Turkey's “Pseudo Citizens”

Minorities in Turkey are officially defined based on the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. The Treaty of Lausanne granted minority status only to “non-Muslim” minorities, Greek, Armenian and Jewish. Therefore, only these minorities have a right to education in their mother tongues and govern their community properties, churches, and schools. Even though the treaty included some of the non-Muslim groups, such as Assyrians in southeastern regions of Anatolia from exercising their minority rights (Oran, 2000; 2007). One might claim that non-Muslim minorities were not among the populations that the Turkish state had any interest to turning into “ideal citizens” or assimilating. As in Bulgaria and Greece, the most common way to deal with such populations, which the dominant group has no interest or hope of turning into “ideal citizens” was ethnic cleansing, or massacres and genocide. Most of the Armenian population was annihilated before the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The Greek Christian Orthodox population was “cleansed” while Greece was “cleansing” its Muslim population with a population exchange treaty between the two states in 1926. At the time when the antisemitism was at its peak in Europe, the Jews were targeted in the 1934 the Eastern Thrace Pogroms (Trakya Olayları) (Guttstadt, 2009, pp. 56-81). And finally, with the 1955 Istanbul Pogroms (6-7 Eylül Olayları), non-Muslims but especially the Istanbulite Greeks were targeted (Güven, 2006). As a result, the number of non-Muslims in Turkey dramatically decreased to less than one percent (Republic of Turkey Presidency of Religious Affairs, 2014, pp. 3-4).

Based on the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey did not grant Kurds, Circassians, Albanians, Bosnians, Arabs and other Muslim ethnicities minority statuses. Religion, despite, massive secular propaganda since 1923, is still an important “unifier” identity marker in the Turkish minority discourse. As in immigrations to Turkey, Turkish policy defines the “ideal citizen” as the one who identifies himself/ herself as Turk and Sunni-Muslim. For example, Gagauzes, the Turkish-speaking Christians Orthodox people in Moldova, were not considered to be of “Turkish origin” according to the Turkish Law on Settlement of 1934 (Kirişçi, 2003), but Bosnian Muslims and Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia were.
Turkish nationalism, since the Young Turks and the rule of Committee of Union and Progress, shifted the role of ethnic Turks from \textit{unsur-i asli} (main ethnic group) to \textit{millet-i hakime} (ruling or dominant nation). Thus, Turkish nationalism evolved into rejecting and suppressing any other Muslim ethnic minority identifications (Yeğen, 2007). The state’s goal was that one day Kurds together with other non-ethnic Turk but Muslim groups would be assimilated into the ethnically defined Turkishness. With the nation-building policies in the Republican period, use of Kurdish language and Kurdish personal names were banned or restricted (O’neil, 2007). Despite several Kurdish rebellions, the state refused to recognize their cultural rights. However, the status of Kurds in Turkey is ambiguous. At one point, the Kurds are referred as proper members of the Turkish society, and in return, it was expected that they would not ask for “cultural/ minority rights” (Yeğen, 2009).

With the acceleration of the EU agenda in the late 1990s, the ban on publishing in Kurdish was lifted in 1991, and on education in 2000. Turkey’s EU candidacy increased the momentum grating Kurds their minority rights, including the broadcasting of a Kurdish TV channel by the Turkish State Radio and Television agency, and Kurdish language institutes at some universities (Reuters, 2009). Several Kurdish political parties started to be represented in the Turkish National Parliament since the 1990s. However, the Constitutional Court continuously outlawed these parties, and then new ones would be formed. After outlawing DTP (Democratic Society Party) in 2009, BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) was established. And finally, HDP (Peoples' Democratic Party) was established to became more like an umbrella party by including smaller left-wing parties and organizations.

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) government which has been in the power since 2002 started the so-called “peace process” with Kurds in 2013 until it was discontinued by the government following the June 7th general election results in which AKP lost its majority in the parliament. While BDP had to participate in 2011 elections with “independent” candidates due to the ten percent election threshold of the Turkish election system, HDP passed the threshold both on the June 7th and November 1st elections in 2015. Following the June 7th election, the AKP government started excessive military operations in the Kurdish areas of the Southeastern Turkey (Bayram, 2015). Currently, after termination of “peace talks” between the Turkish Government and the Kurds, it seems like that the AKP-style Turkish nationalism redefines those especially secular Kurds as “pseudo-citizens” (Yeğen, 2009). AKP-style Turkish nationalism favors those who are more inclined to the political Islam (Dünya Bülteni, 2015; Haber TV, 2015).
4. Conclusion

The end of the Cold War, the dissolution the Soviet Union and the fall of Eastern European state-socialist regimes as well as the EU processes have been experienced by all the three countries but with different degrees of intensity. While Bulgaria and Greece became members of the EU, Turkey’s accession has remained in jeopardy. Limiting comparative studies to only among the former state-socialist countries and excluding their neighbors with no state-socialist experience, such as Greece and Turkey, can neither grasp the complexities nor similarities of their minority and citizenship policies neither during after the World War II nor in the post-1989 period. The EU process made significant improvements in the policies of Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey towards their “unwanted” populations. For example, Bulgaria signed and ratified the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities in 1999. Greece signed the Convention in 1997 but has not yet ratified it. Turkey together with France, Andorra, and Monaco are the only four Council of Europe members who have not signed the Convention (Council of Europe, 2008). Turkey also amended its “Law of Citizenship” in 2009 (The Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Interior, Directorate General of Migration Management 2009) and removed special arrangements for foreigners of ethnic Turkish origin. Similarly, Greece changed the discriminatory Article 19 which was the cause of loss of Greek citizenship of around 60,000 people. However, Greece still has a differentiation between foreigners of Greek ethnic origin (homogenis) and non-Greek ethnic origin (allogenis) and has abstained from signing the European Convention on Nationality of 1997 which would require ending the discrimination between homogenis and allogenis. Despite the amendment to the Greek Law of Citizenship in 2010, the law still favors homogenis. For instance, after the amendment, 87 percent (9,180) of total 10,502 naturalizations in 2011 and 2012 were among those who are of Greek ethnic origin or homogenis (Christopoulos 2013). Similarly, Bulgarian Law of Citizenship also still favors those who are from the ethnic Bulgarian background. It is estimated that there were around 200,000 Macedonians who want to acquire Bulgarian citizenship (Tiroler Tageszeitung, 2015).

There were remarkable improvements in minority rights in the three states with the EU process. Turks of Bulgaria can use their language in personal names and have a right to study Turkish as an elective subject in national and municipal schools (Haksöz, 2008). However, according to the Bulgarian constitution, there is no “ethnic minority” in the country, and “Christian Orthodoxy” is not the “official,” but only the “traditional” religion of the country (The National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria, n.d.). However, far-right and nationalist parties still do not promote minority rights. Even the ten-minute news program in the state TV is always under attack from right-wing parties (Novinite.com, 2009a). There is also still a ban on
using a language other than Bulgarian in election campaigns which primarily targets the Turkish minority (Leviev-Sawyer, 2014). Similarly, in spite of the European Court of Human Rights rulings against Greece, it still does not recognize its Turkish minority, and insist that they are “Muslim minority.” Thus, Greek courts continue to ban the use of “Turkish” in the names of minority associations since the 1980s (The Library of Congress, 2012). Education in mother tongue for the Turkish-speaking minority in Greece was guaranteed under the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. However, in the last decade, there were school closures and lack of bilingual education for Turkish-speaking pupils (Osman Adalı, 2015). The state broadcasting agency of Turkey has now a 24-hour TV channel broadcasting only in Kurdish, there are few Kurdish language programs at few universities, and within the last decade pupils have been able to study the Kurdish language as an elective subject in schools. However, after the termination of “peace process” civilians of Kurdish origin were still targets of violence (Akinci and Williams, 2015). Since the summer of 2015, Turkish police and military have relaunched operations in Kurdish cities which caused many civilian lives (Bayram, 2015).

There are still similar restrictive policies in migration policies of the three states in post-socialist and the EU period. Turkey still holds geographical limitations to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Thus, it does not grant refugee status for those who are fleeing from places other than Europe but give them temporary shelter until they are resettled in a third country (UNHCR, 2014). With the Syrian Civil War, the number of refugees in Turkey has risen to around 2 million people. These people have fled to EU countries, mainly through Greek Aegean Islands, but also through Bulgaria. The number of refugees entering Greece through the end of October, 2015 surpassed a half million (UNHCR, 2015). Not do only these countries lack efficient social policies and do not desire to give permanent shelter and integrate refugees, there is strong anti-refugee discourse. Thus, understandably most of the refugees prefer to stay in neither Turkey nor Greece nor Bulgaria, but to continue to the Western EU countries and mainly to Germany where they are hoping for a better social protection (Frellick, 2015).

Despite all the positive impacts of the EU process in the post-socialist era, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey still have major problems with their politics of migration and citizenship. One fundamental failure of the EU is that it insufficiently addressed shortcomings and discriminatory nature of these policies, and especially the discourse of “unwanted” vs. “desired” populations in both political, legal, and everyday life spheres. For instance, Syrian refugees are welcomed by the people in Turkey, being regarded as from the same religion, “Muslim brothers and sisters,” and at the same time are “unwanted” because they are ethnically Turks. Besides current stigmatization
of labeling the refugees as “potential terrorists,” Bulgarian and Greek political discourse labels Syrian refugees as the “unwanted” populations by being Muslim and Arab or Kurdish-speaking. State sponsored nationalist discourse of “unwanted” vs. “desired” populations is one of the main reasons of xenophobia and extremism in the three countries, which should be more actively challenged domestically as well as by more direct the EU implementations.

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