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The Turkish Minority in Contemporary Bulgaria*

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> Although there is indisputable evidence of hostile perceptions, the gulf between ethnic groups has not yet caused any substantial violence between Turks and Bulgarians. Compared not only with former Yugoslavia but also with Romania, this must be upheld as a genuine success story in the endeavor to cope with ethnic tensions in post-Communist Eastern Europe. (Wolfgang Hoepken)[1]

The Turkish minority in Bulgaria represents a case of ethnic interaction that has for the most part sustained a civil character since the collapse of the communist regime in late 1989. This ethnic peace has prevailed despite a long-term history of policies and practices that have at times placed inter-ethnic cooperation in severe jeopardy. The Bulgarian case may also have broader social-scientific significance due to the presence of numerous factors that, in many other contexts, seem to have produced deeply troubled polities. One scholar concludes that by the early twenty-first century, ethnic-based conflict in Bulgaria "has diminished to such an extent that minority questions no longer present a direct challenge to the new [post-communist] regime."[2] What can account for the comparatively peaceful and civil relations between Turks in Bulgaria and the Bulgarian majority?

Few readers will need to be informed that ethnic-related conflicts in the late twentieth century were numerous, bloody, and often highly difficult if not impossible to resolve. Nonetheless, it has been recently demonstrated that the cases of ethnic conflict in the late twentieth century are, in fact, numerous only in *absolute* terms: when viewed from the arithmetic perspective of *potential* conflict, the world has witnessed relatively few situations of violent ethnic conflict.[3] Fearon and Laitin attribute this pattern—which they refer to as a "norm of interethnic peace, and how it occasionally breaks down"—to various formal and informal institutions that "usually work to 'cauterize' disputes between individual members of different groups."[4] Further, data compiled by Robert Ted Gurr demonstrate a *global decline* in the incidence of ethnic warfare in the 1990s, despite the several outbreaks of truly horrific and grand-scale violence (Rwanda, 1994; Kosovo, 1998–1999, *etc.*).[5] Gurr offers that, globally,

> Relations between ethnic groups and governments changed in the 1990s in ways that suggest that a new regime governing minority–majority relations is being built—a

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> widely held set of principles about how to handle intergroup relations in heterogeneous states, a common repertoire of strategies for handling crises, and an emerging domestic and international consensus on how to respond to ethnic repression and violence.[6]

Recent research on ethnic conflict has also sought to find underlying patterns in the escalation or de-escalation of violent relations among ethnic groups. Victor Levine, in particular, has developed a useful model describing the "modal ontogeny" of ethnic conflict, identifying three typical phases of ethnic conflict and factors that appear to either escalate or de-escalate conflict: an *incipient phase*, an *open phase*, and in worst-case scenarios, an *out-of-control phase*.[7] Why do some multi-ethnic countries experience little conflict, while others seem perpetually blighted with the very real possibility of such conflict degenerating into the *out-of-control* phase? Much research still needs to be conducted to more fully answer this question. In this essay we explore the pertinence and applicability of the patterns uncovered by Fearon/Laitin, Gurr, and Levine to the case of contemporary Bulgaria's Turkish minority; in doing so, we hope to begin accounting for the generally peaceful relations between the Turks of Bulgaria and the ethnic Bulgarian majority.

A number of factors may serve to fuel an ethnic conflict—such as the presence of "primordial" sentiments of nationality which emerge as nationalism when a certain level of modernization is reached;[8] the non-rational aspect of ethno-nationalism;[9] and the fact that in some cases of ethnic conflict ethno-nationalist sentiments have been stirred up by ambitious political elites who use such sentiment for the advancement of their own personal agenda.[10] Before delving into the various factors that seem to have made for relative ethnic peace in post-1989 Bulgaria, however, we offer a brief demographic and historical sketch.

The Turkish minority in Bulgaria numbers around 662,700 citizens, representing about 9% of the country's population of 7,537,929 (2003 estimate, with a growth rate of –0.6%).[11] It is important to note that the percentage of Turks among the overall Bulgarian population has declined steadily since Bulgaria gained independence from the Ottoman (Turkish) Empire in 1878. Other ethnic groups are present in contemporary Bulgaria, but represent small fractions of the population: Gypsies, 2.6%; Macedonians, 2.5%; Armenians, 0.3%; Russians, 0.2%; and others, 0.6%.[12] The Turkish minority is generally concentrated in the eastern, and particularly in the northeastern, regions of the country, although scattered communities are also found in the western regions, especially in the Rhodope mountains.[13] The demographic picture is complicated by disparate growth rates between ethnic Bulgarians and the various minority groups. Although the overall population growth rate for Bulgaria is negative, the birthrate for various minority groups is not.[14] Bulgaria is a rather poor country, and this has consequences not only for the prospects for full democratization, but also for the character of ethnic politics. The Turkish minority is largely agricultural and rural, whereas of the total Bulgarian population only 33.8% lived in rural settlements as late as 1984.[15] We return to this theme below.

To understand the contemporary political situation in Bulgaria regarding ethnic

relations, it is useful to consider four general periods in Bulgarian history: the Turkish occupation and imperial overlordship; from independence until the establishment of the communist regime (1878–1947); the communist era (1947–1989); and the post-communist period (1989 to the present).[16] The following briefly considers each period.

Bulgaria in the Ottoman Empire

Most of the territory comprising contemporary Bulgaria was under the control of the Ottoman Empire from the late fourteenth century until 1878, when independence was won with the military and diplomatic help of the Russian Empire. The Bulgarians and Turks differ strongly in language, cultural practices, and traditional religious orientation (Turks are predominantly Sunni Muslim, Bulgarians overwhelmingly Eastern Orthodox), and even to some degree in physiognomy. With the Ottoman conquest during the latter years of the European medieval era, Bulgaria was incorporated into the Ottoman imperial economic system in a subordinate position. Significantly, this occurred at a time when the roots of early modern commerce were emerging in the West. Bulgarian Christians within the Ottoman system endured systematic, religiously based economic discrimination that would have long-range effects on the socioeconomic status of Turks and Bulgarians, thus contributing another sharply distinguishing factor between the two peoples.

As elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, Turkish overlordship involved the use of the *millet* system of regional governance, which provided for toleration of non-Muslim religious groups (or at least those who were "people of the book," *i.e.* Christians or Jews) and some degree of self-governance, particularly in religious matters. However, the system relegated non-Muslims to permanent second-class status, and prescribed specific practices and proscribed others. For example, type and color of clothing for Jews and Christians were regulated,[17] and, particularly, economic activity. A significant aspect of the *millet* system, however, was the principle that members of each *millet* group were beholden to adhere to the regulations of their own group, rather than adhere to the *Shariat per se* (the body of Islamic law). This principle may, at least in the Bulgarian case, have helped create the conditions that Fearon and Laitin identify as critical for the maintenance of ethnic peace—"in-group policing" to keep violence *among* groups from escalating out of control. Hugh Poulton describes the operation of the *millet* system in Bulgaria under Ottoman control thus:

> The Ottoman state treated the *millets* like corporate bodies. It encouraged the perpetuation of their internal structures and hierarchies by dealing exclusively with their leaders and not individual members. These structures included educational systems specific to each religious community. The *millet* became established as the prime focus of identity outside family and locality, bequeathing a legacy of confusion in modern times between concepts of citizenship, religion, and ethnicity. Furthermore,

> as the millet system placed control of education and much of their internal affairs in the hands of the millet hierarchy, and hence beyond the official state control, it proved ideally suited to the transmission of the new ideology of nationalism intruding from the West—especially the Christian *millets*, despite frequent tension between the traditional *millet* leaders and the new nationalist radicals.[18]

With the rise of Bulgarian nationalism in the 1800s, however, much of this "legacy of confusion" was simplified and ultimately obviated with the winning of independence in 1878.

The overall historical legacy would seem to produce a configuration of demographic, political, and historical forces that might create in Bulgaria richly fertile ground for ethnic conflict between the two groups in the contemporary era. In terms of governmental actions toward the Turkish minority, the history of modern Bulgaria has indeed witnessed instances of treatment that can reasonably be described as discriminatory, selective, and repressive. Even basic demographic information can be problematical, given the historical tendency for statistics to be used in this region for political purposes. Ali Eminov notes, "Official figures provided by most Balkan countries about the size of minority populations are suspect. Manipulation of demographic statistics to strengthen ethnic claims to disputed territories has a long history in the Balkans."[19] At the same time, however, relations among the peoples themselves within Bulgaria (ethnic Turks, other minority groups, and ethnic Bulgarians) have been rather conspicuously devoid of the violent interaction that unfortunately characterized much of the region in numerous instances throughout the twentieth century. Further, it appears that the manner in which these groups have interacted has had the overall effect of helping the country move beyond the various bouts of severe repression during the communist Zhivkov regime and toward a democratic polity based on a reasonably stable civil society. We explore below several explanations of how this situation evolved.

1878–1947: The First Decades of Modern Independence

From independence in 1878 until the establishment of the communist regime in December 1947, the political regime in Bulgaria might be best described as conservative with pronounced and persistent authoritarian tendencies.[20] What began as one of the most progressive constitutions in Europe (the Turnovo Constitution) ended up being increasingly disregarded after World War I and was formally suspended in 1934. It is useful to address the issue of ethnic politics from the perspective of two related, but distinctly different issues: the policies and practices effected by the Bulgarian authorities; and the nature of relations among the various ethnic groups, principally the Turkish minority and the Bulgarian majority. Historians have offered dramatically contrasting views on each of these aspects.

Some historians and other observers view the post-1918 regime as being driven by motives that sought to bring about a just, fair, and equal society for all citizens on

Bulgarian territory. Other historical accounts offer that the Bulgarian regime was, in varying degrees, discriminatory and repressive.[21] The historical record itself appears rather mixed. There is ample evidence of the Bulgarian regime offering formal guarantees of equality, freedom, and non-discriminatory treatment for all groups, yet at the same time there clearly existed a gap between the formal promises of the regime's ideals, and the actual political realities. In this respect Bulgaria was perhaps not much different from many other recently independent nation-states. Such a gap between ideal and reality existed in Bulgaria, but could not be fairly described as gaping. That was to change, however, after the Communist Party's ascent to power after World War II.

It was certainly the case that the Turks in Bulgaria demonstrated a rather high level of civic involvement in the inter-war period. Zhelyazkova depicts the Turks in Bulgaria as having been active during the inter-war period in pressing for certain reforms:

> In the 1930's, a movement for establishing modern secular Turkish schools arose among the Turkish intellectuals. Of course, they were influenced by the reforms undertaken in Turkey herself and the charisma of Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk ... From Bulgaria's Liberation to 1944, the members of the Turkish ethnic community freely enjoyed the right to circulate information in their own language. Several dozens of newspapers were published in Turkish. Many political parties issued some of their newspapers in the Turkish language. The dailies and other literature published in Turkey were available in Bulgaria. The Turks had several cultural–educational and sports societies: Turan, Altin Ordu, Alparslan and some others, which terminated their activity in 1934, when all kinds of parties and associations were banned and the democratic liberties were restricted. Some attempts were made to create ethnic parties, but they failed. Nevertheless, in the Bulgarian parliament there have always been deputies of Turkish or Muslim background, who have been elected by the ballots of the national parties.[22]

Perhaps the most balanced view is that offered by Wolfgang Hopken, who views the Bulgarian state as having pursued a vacillating policy toward the Turks and other minorities, but generally driven by fear and resentment of Turkey.[23] This foreign-policy-derived disposition, however, rested upon a foundation of generally civil and stable relations between ethnic Turks and Bulgarians during that period.

Relations among Bulgarian Ethnic Groups, 1878–1947

Antonina Zhelyazkova has characterized relations between the Turkic minority and the Bulgarian majority with the Turkish term *komshuluk*, roughly meaning "good neighborliness." The Bulgarian Turks who did not migrate to Turkey were generally loyal to the Bulgarian state and for the most part got along reasonably well with their majority-compatriots:

> The Turks, who remained in their birthplaces, did not cause any particular trouble to the authorities. They demonstrated more than once their loyalty to the state, including

> by enlistment in the Bulgarian army and participating in the wars in which Bulgaria was involved. The system of peaceful coexistence of Christians and Moslems, Turks and Bulgarians, functioned smoothly over the centuries, being based on mutual respect of traditions, of the specific characteristics of everyday life, and of *komshuluk*.[24]

Other historians depict relations between Turks and Bulgarians as fraught with tension and distrust. These historians point to the waves of emigration, which indicate to them that, for Turks in Bulgaria, life as they knew it was simply less desirable than even the *prospect* of a better life in a Turkey. Turkish historian Bilal Simsir reflects such a view, depicting the Bulgarian state as having persecuted the various Muslim minorities to a greater or lesser degree since independence in 1878.[25]

In a similar vein, it worth noting in passing that historians also have offered rather sharply contrasting views of the origins of Islam in the Balkans.[26] Rather predictably, those favorable to the historical presence of the Islamic faith in the Balkans tend to view it as having come with the expansion of Turkish civilization in Anatolia and the Balkan peninsula. Those less disposed to a favorable view of Islam's presence view it as having been imposed as a result of the expanding Ottoman Empire's intrusion into lands whose population had been Orthodox Christian for nearly a millennium. For the purposes of this essay, it will suffice to note that the differences in historical interpretation do not appear to reflect themselves in bitterly conflictual religion-based politics.[27] But these varying historical interpretations *do* reflect a religious line of social cleavage between ethnic Turks and ethnic Bulgarians which reinforces the other lines of cleavage—linguistic, ethnic, and regional, and socioeconomic (Bulgarian Turks are generally poorer, less literate, and more rural than the Bulgarian majority; we return to this theme below). And the general experience of the modern world has been that mutually reinforcing lines of social cleavage create fertile ground for particularly intense conflict.

1947–1989: A Half-Century of Rule by Repression

Following the model of Soviet communism in Stalin's USSR, the communist era in Bulgaria was also characterized by severe political repression. Much has been written on the nature of these regimes, and no reiteration is necessary here.[28] It is worth noting, however, that the historical origins of the regime—in short, imposition by force under inexorable duress from the Soviet Union—were such that regime legitimacy was problematical from beginning to end. Nissan Oren tersely concludes in *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power*,

> The march of the Red Army into Bulgaria made the conquest of Communism inevitable. Yet the consolidation of Communist power did not come without struggle. Bulgarian peasants and townspeople resisted as few other East Europeans did. The anti-Communist opposition was not appeased. Rather, it was subdued and crushed by force. From the outset the contest was between unequals. The Red Army did not intervene directly. It did not have to. Its mere presence provided the Communists with an overwhelming advantage which their opponents could not overcome.[29]

In the realm of ethnic relations, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) also followed the general Soviet orientation, which held that ethnic minorities should be granted a degree of political and cultural autonomy while pursuing, with the rest of the country, the common goals of "communist construction" at home and support for the foreign policies of the regime. In each of these domains, the regime emphasized the ideological theme of *proletarian internationalism* as the concept by which the true interests of the working classes of all ethnic groups—indeed all peoples of the world—could and ultimately would be harmonized as the demise of global capitalist-imperialism approached. In practice, however, the Marxist–Leninist regimes of the twentieth century repressed nationalist movements in any form. Those movements most likely to be fueled by religious sentiments were especially targeted. It will be useful to digress to a brief description of Soviet theory and practice regarding ethnic minorities and the overarching goal of "communist construction."

The Soviet regime was determined to forge a unified sense of political identity among the various ethnic groups of the USSR. That sense of identity was envisioned to transcend national, ethnic, and particularly religious points of reference.[30] While this determination pre-dated the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, it was not until the early 1970s that the Soviet regime declared, officiously, that the USSR had created "a new historical community—the Soviet people."[31] With this notion came the assurance that the "national question" had been resolved, completely and irreversibly. After only a few years of Soviet *perestroika* it became painfully clear that this was not the case. The ethnic riots in Alma-Ata in December 1986, the bloody conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh beginning in the winter of 1987–1988, and the declarations of sovereignty by Latvia and Estonia in 1988 were but the harbingers of the ethno-nationalist movements that would contribute so directly to the collapse of the USSR by December 1991. Soviet nationality policy was driven by the overarching goal of a "drawing together" (Russian *sblizheniye*) of all peoples of the USSR, followed by an eventual "fusion" (Russian *sliyaniye*). As the Brezhnev years proceeded, the goal of "fusion" appears to have been moderated by the political need to placate minority groups. At the same time, however, the growing disparity in population growth rates between the Slavic peoples and the non-Slavic minorities underscored the need for some ideological device to buttress a sense of national identity. The *de facto* device appears to have been Russian nationalism, although the political consequences of this aggravated minority demands for greater autonomy.

Ironically, as the USSR was beginning to grant considerably greater *actual* autonomy and political rights to the various ethnic minorities in the USSR under *perestroika*, the Bulgarian communist regime under Todor Zhivkov was contemporaneously squelching minority rights and autonomy in a manner far surpassing anything seen since independence was achieved in 1878. The Zhivkov regime, like its Soviet model, honored the principles of "self-determination of nations," political autonomy for ethnic minority groups, and political freedom more in the breach than in reality. Bulgarian sociologist Georgi Fotev recently noted rather curtly,

> The Communist Party in Bulgaria deluded itself into believing the ambiguous communist doctrine according to which *ethnoses* were epiphenomena marginal to the class structure of society, but it also saw the opportunity of using the ethnic mobilizing effect of promising equal rights to all *ethnoses*.[32]

The path to this ideological reductionism took several turns, however: from the establishment of the communist regime in 1947 until around 1958 the ideals of minority rights and political autonomy were apparently manifest to some degree. Even as late as 1964, Zhivkov himself extolled the purported ideals of Marxist–Leninist concepts of minority rights and autonomy, stating that "all possible opportunities have been created for the Turkish population to develop their culture and language freely."[33]

However, in the early 1950s several policy shifts were put into effect, including a ban on the reading of the Koran, active propagandization by the Communist Party regarding women's equality, and, perhaps most importantly, the implementation of a Soviet-modeled collectivization campaign. These created a backlash among the Turkish minority. Zhelyazkova notes,

> The BCP started warring against the "manifestations of nationalism and religious fanaticism among the local Turks." The offensive was nationwide and total, because the forcible collectivization of agricultural land had to be accomplished within a fixed term throughout the whole country, and it had already reached the mountainous and semi-mountainous regions populated by Muslims. The fact of being deprived of their land struck panic in the Turks and the Pomaks, most of whom were agricultural workers and farmers. This let loose one of the largest Bulgarian Turkish emigrant tides flowing into the Republic of Turkey—nearly 155,000 in the period 1950–51.[34]

This particular wave of emigrants led to some friction between the Turkish and Bulgarian authorities, but in the final analysis may have served as a social and political "safety valve" that kept potential ethnic-based conflict inside Bulgaria within manageable proportions.[35]

A special plenum of the Central Committee Politburo on 4 October 1958 initiated a marked shift in policy toward the Turks and other minorities. This shift involved a further curtailment of the (admittedly already restricted) freedoms, "a new concept of ethnic and national structure in inter-ethnic relations in Bulgaria," and a "sharp change in policy toward the Turks and the Bulgarian Moslems" whose goal of "full assimilation" was chillingly straightforward.[36] Matters did not improve for the Turks and other minorities throughout the 1960s and 1970s. However, the most grievous departure from the lofty principles of "minority rights" and ethnic minority group "autonomy" clearly came about during the 1980s with the Zhivkov regime's attempts at "Bulgarization" of the Turkic minority. (Here it should be noted that Hugh Poulton depicts the Pomaks as having suffered as badly as the Turks during the various concerted assimilationist attempts, except that the Pomaks' persecution can be dated from very early in the communist era, beginning in 1948).[37]

This campaign was politically complex in motivation and to be understood in any depth must be interpreted in light of several aspects of Soviet experience and of Marxist–Leninist theory. Perhaps most importantly, The "Bulgarization" episodes are significant for understanding the complex pattern of ethnic relations in Bulgaria after the demise of the communist regime in 1989.[38] This political situation was further complicated by the Bulgarian regime's use of ethnic Turks to carry out foreign policy goals, specifically the infiltration into Turkey of cadres loyal to the Soviet bloc and presumably with intent to serve Soviet purposes within Turkey.[39] While doing so, the regime accused the West, and in particular "certain Western circles and radio stations which are still in the orbit of the 'Cold War,'" of instigating political unrest in Bulgaria.[40]

The political and economic changes in the USSR and the impending changes across Eastern Europe by the summer and fall of 1989 were dramatic. The contemporaneous anti-Turk administrative pogroms in Bulgaria under Zhivkov appear to be related to these events, even though the "Bulgarization" campaign represented a mere continuation, in intensified form, of the assimilationist goal pursued by the Bulgarian Communist Party since the early 1960s. However, the advent of *perestroika* in the USSR may have led to an increasingly acute sense of political insecurity within the Zhivkov regime. In this regard the "Bulgarization" campaign might be seen as a ruthless attempt by a pathetically insecure authoritarian regime to effect an ethnic *Gleichschaltung*.[41]

Whatever violations of civility might be involved in such a policy were justified by the threadbare Marxist–Leninist notions of "proletarian internationalism," "the unity of the socialist state," and the need to "combat manifestations of bourgeoisie nationalism." The campaign also appears to have been driven, in part, by a perception by the Zhivkov regime that the growth rates of the Turkish and other Muslim minorities were dangerously superseding that of the ethnic Bulgarians. Ali Eminov asserts that the Zhivkov regime distorted statistics to induce fear among the population, among other motives.[42] The proposed solution, "Bulgarization" of the entire population, ironically helped both to undermine the legitimacy of the entire political system and to create the political–psychological foundations for the later emergence of a more tolerant, ethnically pluralistic civil society.

The overthrow of the Zhivkov regime on 10 November 1989 is still rather shrouded in secrecy. Deyan Kiuranov, an opposition leader, asserts that "I did not believe in Zhivkov's downfall until it happened—and indeed for some time after."[43] The overthrow appears to have been a *coup d'état* within the top echelons of the Party itself, little effective opposition having emerged in Bulgarian society due to the political stranglehold of the Zhivkov regime. Linz and Stepan offer that the regime "approximated the totalitarian ideal type until 1988" in terms of (lack of) pluralism, mobilization, ideology, and leadership.[44] Could there be a connection between this extreme form of political repression and the particularly solicitous, almost quiescent post-communist ethnic climate in Bulgaria?

As noted above, the "Bulgarization" campaign of the mid to late 1980s may have unwittingly created the foundations for a more tolerant, ethnically pluralistic polity by identifying and clarifying that the *true* enemy of political and civil rights for all Bulgarians was the dictatorial Marxist–Leninist regime of Tidor Zhivkov, and *not* the ethnic "other." Zhelyazkova regards the repression as a mobilizing factor, not of ethnic Turks against ethnic Bulgarians, but of the people against the totalitarian state of Zhivkov:

> In Bulgaria, the mobilization of the civil society for the transition, well before the anti-Communist motivation had been realized and brought into use, was carried out under the slogans of "democracy," "human rights," "equal rights for minorities." There existed a widely-supported aspiration to immediately extinguish the consequences of the outrages committed against the Muslim Bulgarian citizens. A certain part of the Bulgarian society is united in its feeling of collective shame that no attempt had been made to defend the Pomaks and the Turks from violence and defamation, the way the Jews had been protected in earlier times.[45]

She proceeds to describe the sense of "solidarity with the minorities" among the Bulgarian majority during the transition, and reports that, shortly after the downfall of the Zhivkov regime, amnesty laws were promulgated and presidential decrees issued on behalf of Turks who had suffered discrimination, imprisonment, forced change of name, *etc*.[46]

In the short run, however, the "Bulgarization" campaign is reported to have caused an exodus of over 300,000 ethnic Turks by 1989, and was condemned in a Helsinki Watch Report as "one of Europe's largest refugee flows since WWII and threatening to annihilate Turkish culture."[47] Antonina Zhelyazkova offers approximate numbers of people emigrating from Bulgaria in a series of waves, according to the pattern shown in Table 1.

The approximate percentages of ethnic Turks living in Bulgaria were as follows, according to Zhelyazkova: 1878, nearly 20%; 1900–1925, around 12%; 1940s, under 10%; 1950s, 8.6%.[48] It seems impossible that such a massive sociological dislocation should have little or no longer-term political consequences upon a country with a relatively small population and with a history so tightly intertwined with the neighboring people of Turkey. The following sections explore what those consequences appear to have been since the collapse of the Zhivkov regime in 1989 and, along with it, the "Bulgarization" campaign.

1989 to the Present: The Nature of the Post-communist Regime; Contemporary Inter-ethnic Relations and Their Theoretical, Cross-National Significance

It will be useful to consider the case of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria in two main areas: the pattern of *official* policies and practices pursued by the post-communist regime; and the pattern of relations among the groups themselves, irrespective of official policies and practices. The two are related, of course, but analytically

TABLE 1
Approximate emigration of Turks from Bulgaria

Period	Number of Muslims emigrating (mostly Turks, but also Pomaks, Cherkhez, and Tatars)
1878–1912	350,000
1913–1934	10,000–12,000
1940–1944	15,000
1950–1951	155,000
1968–1978	130,000
1989	360,000
1990–1997	30,000–60,000

Source: Antonina Zhelyazkova, "The Fate of the Turks in Bulgaria from 1878 to 1989,", in Antonina Zhelyazkova, ed., *Between Adaptation and Nostalgia: The Bulgarian Turks in Turkey* (Sofia: International Center for Problems of Minorities and Cultural Interaction), pp. 11–12.

distinct, especially in terms of the questions of why peace and cooperation prevail, why these are problematical, or at worst, why they are absent. It will be useful to begin by outlining the character of the Bulgarian post-communist regime.

Ali Eminov has offered that the "extreme anti-Turkish policies of 1984–90 had the effect of strengthening Turkish ethnic identity ... Many Turks became more militantly Turkish than they had been previously," and that "unfortunately authoritarian tendencies in Bulgarian life remain."[49] Nonetheless, since the collapse of the Zhivkov regime in 1989, Bulgaria has established a political system in which formal democratic principles are in place and for the most part operative. Significantly, the new regime began by quickly branding the 'Bulgarization' campaign a "grave political error, and pledged itself to the defense of human rights."[50] Consistent with these principles, reasonably fair and clean parliamentary and presidential elections have been held since 1989. In the most recent of these, a two-round presidential election on 27 October and 3 November 1996 brought current President Petar Stojanov to power with 59.7% of the vote in the second round, and in the parliamentary elections of 19 April 1997 seven parties gained seats in the 240 National Assembly, with the United Democratic Forces gaining 137 seats, easily sufficient to form the government (prime minister and cabinet).[51]

Further, there is an umbrella-like political party that has presented itself as the voice of the various minority groups, the Union for National Salvation (UNS). In the 1997 parliamentary elections (19 April 1997), the UNS was composed of three party-like groups: the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF; *Dvišenie za Pravata i Svobodie*; a Turkish minority party); the Green Party (*Zelena Partija*); and the Union New Choice (*Sajuz Nov Izbor*). The UNS won 7.6 % of the vote in that election, gaining 19 seats in the 240-member parliament by surpassing the 4% minimum

barrier. Proportional representation is used to allocate seats in parliament among the various parties. In the elections scheduled for 200l (specific dates for which have not yet been established as of this writing), the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is projected to play a pivotal role in the likelihood of a coalition-government situation.[52] If that is so, and the MRF were to evolve into a political-strategic role similar to that of the "king-making" *Frei Demokratische Partei* in Germany, then the political role of the Turks in Bulgaria would seem destined to be a very significant one indeed. For that reason, the better the inter-ethnic relations, the better the chances for Bulgaria's new democracy to continue.

But there have indeed been frictions, disagreements, and serious disputes among the various parties over matters that have involved questions of ethnicity. These include the disputed mayoral race of 1995 in Kurdzhali, which is predominantly Turkish,[53] and other local cases. Such occurrences, however, are arguably part and parcel of democratic governance; wholesale ethnic repression, terrorization, and expulsions are not. Since 1989, Bulgaria fortunately has been characterized much more by the former than the latter. The post-communist reform has been beleaguered, however, by disappointing economic progress, and this has unfortunately impinged upon ethnic relations.

Significantly, Wolfgang Hoepken cites the relative economic conditions of ethnic Turks and ethic Bulgarians as problematic:

> An even greater danger to the Turkish minority [than ethnic Bulgarians "playing the anti-Turkish card"] lies in its constantly deteriorating economic situation. While economic reform in post-Communist Bulgaria has been far from radical, the results have been much more unfavorable for the Turkish than the Bulgarian population ... The danger of increasing social and economic instability is the main threat to the existing state of ethnic relations in Bulgaria.[54]

In characterizing relations between ethnic Turks and the Bulgarian majority, perhaps it is thus useful to begin with a basic demographic profile. The Turkish minority is largely rural and even less socioeconomically developed than the Bulgarian majority. As noted above, the Turkish minority tends to be concentrated in the eastern and southern regions of the country, comprising about 8.5% of the total population. However, the population growth rates for the Turkish minority are in positive numbers, whereas for the country as a whole the numbers are negative. Overall, Bulgaria is a rather poor country, with per capita income not only well below the levels of Western Europe, North America, and Japan, but low for Eastern Europe too. Among ten candidate countries for European Union membership, Bulgaria ranked lowest in gross domestic product per capita (Bulgaria, U.S.$4,980; EU candidates average, U.S.$7,614) as of the year 2000.[55]

Nonetheless, since the collapse of the Zhivkov dictatorship, relations between ethnic Turks and ethnic Bulgarians have been generally civil and peaceful, if somewhat strained. They have certainly *not* been characterized by the vicious, overt, and savagely violent ethnic conflict that has unfortunately occurred in other areas of the

Balkan peninsula or in the Caucasus mountain region in the same time period. However, according to a representative of the MRF party in Shumen (eastern Bulgaria) who was interviewed in July 2000, there definitely exists economic discrimination against the Turkish minority, and it is "much more difficult for Turks to be hired into good positions."[56] The interviewee, an ethnic Turk, nevertheless declared, among other things,

> I am not afraid to talk freely now. But some people prefer to keep their Bulgarian names so that they can find better jobs and secure their children economically. It should not be like this in a democratic country. We must not tolerate total adaptation [*prispsobyavane*] but keep our unique folklore and preserve our traditions.[57]

The social configuration of ethnic groups in Bulgaria thus represents a case of a majority group exercising a sort of economic hegemony over the minorities. The severely discriminatory behavior toward the Turkish minority from the Zhivkov regime clearly has abated.[58] However, that repression was much more overtly *political* than economic.[59]

Perhaps it should be noted that the U.S. State Department's 1999 *Human Rights Report* offers that

> Ethnic Turkish politicians maintain that, although their community's popularly-elected representation in the national assembly is roughly commensurate with its size, ethnic Turks are underrepresented significantly in appointed positions in the state administration.[60]

Ted Robert Gurr, author of the *Minorities at Risk* project, regards the Turks of Bulgaria as one of numerous "dispersed communal minorities" in Eastern Europe and the former USSR who are "in a precarious and possibly vulnerable position," which may "endanger such communal groups, especially economic migrants."[61] Thus, although the severe, overt discrimination of the Zhivkov era was *not* characteristic of Bulgaria's first post-communist decade, various problematical issues remain.

In this regard the episodes of emigration since independence in 1878 are politically significant. There is little doubt that the Bulgarian regime's political motives for allowing emigration were varied, in some cases amounting to *de facto* expulsion. In other cases, the motive was perhaps more clearly, demonstrably humane and intended to serve the better interests of Turkish individuals who, for any number of reasons, simply wished to leave Bulgaria. In any case, emigration as a demographic and political reality may be seen as having had numerous politically beneficial effects from the perspective of the Bulgarian regime: it has served to relieve pressure upon the regime from disaffected minorities, whose demands might well have turned violent or otherwise radical if they were forced to stay in Bulgaria against their will; it has kept the international relationship with Turkey in a much more positive framework than would likely otherwise be the case; and it would appear to have had the effect of contributing to a resuscitation of the spirit of *komshuluk*, or good-neigh-

borliness, among the peoples themselves. This characteristic was identified above as a deeply rooted historical pattern.[62] Aside from the option of an open door for emigration to Turkey, what other factors may contribute to the overall pattern of relative ethnic peace?

The threat of the re-imposition of a tyrannical regime over *all* of society (such as existed in 1947–1989), which would be a much greater evil than potential threats from the ethnic "other" (Turks to Bulgarians, Bulgarians to Turks), appears to have contributed to the general spirit of cooperation. This perception of threat, in turn, may contribute strongly to the "self-correcting" dynamic in inter-ethnic relations that might well otherwise be highly conflictual.[63] Indicators such as relatively high voter turnout rates and a proliferation of interest groups, civic associations, and media outlets all suggest the formation of an increasingly vibrant civil society. Aside from Bulgaria's economic woes, this configuration of social forces may reflect the formation of a political psychology more likely to *de-escalate* simmering ethnic tensions than to allow them to escalate.

Here Victor Levine's model of the "modal ontogeny of ethnic conflict" is particularly useful, viewing ethnic conflict as existing on three general levels: an *incipient phase, open conflict*, and an *out-of-control phase*.[64] In each of these phases, there exists the possibility of de-escalation. Whether that occurs, or whether the conflict proceeds to the next, more serious phase, depends upon a number of factors. Since the end of the Zhivkov regime, Bulgaria should be considered as having maintained itself in the incipient phase.[65] The question is how and why.

The research findings of James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin provide useful clues to answering this question. Their research sought to provide explanations not for the outbreak of ethnic violence, but of what factors make for "ethnic peace" among groups within a given political community. Two factors were identified that are particularly salient: the containment of violently escalating *spiral equilibria* (wherein disputes between individuals tend to spiral out of control beyond the two disputants); and the presence of a certain degree of *in-group policing*, wherein small-scale, individual cases of "ethnic transgression" get ignored, or at least tolerated, with the expectation that "the culprits will be identified and sanctioned by their own ethnic brethren."[66] The relative peace among ethnic groups in Bulgaria suggests the possible presence of *both* patterns.

Although this topic begs further empirical investigation, informed speculation suggests some possible solutions as to how ethnic cooperation has operated in Bulgaria since the downfall of the Zhivkov regime. One can easily imagine how ethnic relations might have degenerated quickly and ferociously after the demise of the dictator. If anything, the opposite happened. Again, the question is what factors made that possible. Fearon and Laitin make a significant point, which is highly germane to the Bulgarian case, about *why* members of an ethnic group would "defect" and report to ethnically different higher authorities about the infractions within their own group:

> Our theoretical analysis suggests an answer. Smaller ethnic groups within a larger society have a great percentage of interactions with outsiders—nearly all Hausa [West Africa] transactions in the kola and cattle trades were with Yorubas—and therefore suffer greatly from a breakdown of relations. *Thus, they face strong incentives to set up effective in-group policing institutions*.[67] (Emphasis added.)

One could conjecture that the centuries-long *millet* system served, in Bulgaria at least, to inculcate patterns of relations with neighboring groups wherein subjects came to defer to their own group leaders in order to perpetuate social peace in the broader scheme of things. Further, the experiences of several generations of social bifurcation between society and the state may have contributed to greater affinity—or, at the very least, civility and tolerance—*among* groups rather than having the absence of freedom emerge as being *caused* by ethnic-based repression.

Another related factor is the role of Turkey in Balkan affairs in general, and particularly in Bulgarian affairs. For the most part, Turkey has seen fit to forbear from interfering in Bulgarian affairs in an inflammatory manner with regard to the Turkish minority. This would seem to be a factor contributing positively to the relative ethnic peace within Bulgaria. Turkish–Bulgarian relations since the demise of the Zhivkov regime have generally been quite good. According to a recent Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty report, Turkey's recent relations with Bulgaria "could hardly be better."[68] To the extent to which this is so, it reflects a deliberate intention of the Turkish regime to cultivate such relations.[69] For Bulgaria's part, the development of cooperative relations with Turkey has also taken a prominent role in the country's post-Zhivkov foreign policy, particularly its national security policy.[70]

Anecdotal evidence explaining the relative ethnic peace may also be found in statements that Bulgarians frequently make about their own political culture, characterizing it as apathetic, sheepish, and given to rather stoic endurance of problems.[71] The view is not infrequently expressed that such characteristics partially explain the absence of rebellions in Bulgaria during the Zhivkov dictatorship, unlike the popular rebellions against the respective communist regimes in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and of course the endurance of the Zhivkov regime itself until late 1989, months after other regimes in the region had collapsed under popular pressure. Even the downfall of Zhivkov's regime was more of a palace coup than a popular uprising. Survey research probing these dimensions of Bulgaria's political culture would further our understanding of which factors are most significant in explaining long-term patterns of its "ethnic peace." Given the highly conflictual character of ethnic relations in the larger region (the Balkans to the Caucasus mountains), such research could be exceptionally illuminating.

The contemporary political climate between Bulgarians and ethnic Turks can be characterized as a measure of unease but with hope for a better future. At worst, it would seem to be characterized by distrust and suspicion with potential for a descent into violence. Perhaps, as a broadly based and deeply rooted civil society develops in Bulgaria, ethnic cooperation will emerge readily from the sort of "decentralized,

nonstate institutional mechanisms" to which Fearon and Laitin attribute such efficacy in mitigating the sort of "problems of opportunism" that have intermittently plagued southeastern Europe for at least the past century.[72]

The question of the role of the state in the development of civil society and the formation of "social capital" in post-totalitarian regimes has garnered significant attention from scholars examining transitions to democratic rule.[73] If it is possible for the state to engage itself in these processes in a constructive manner, the Bulgarian state would certainly appear to have *tried* to do so recently with respect to its treatment of the Turkish minority. On 1 October 2000, for example, Bulgarian state television began airing news in Turkish, and planned to offer news features and entertainment programs in Turkish within three months.[74] The government also provides funding for Turkish-language classes in the public schools, the Ministry of Education being reported to have estimated the number of Bulgarian-Turkish children studying the language at about 40,000.[75] Further, the Bulgarian state recently attained a nearly half-million U.S. dollar grant from the World Bank to strengthen the National Council of Ethnic and Demographic Issues, an organization "responsible for formulating and implementing policies to mainstream ethnic minorities into Bulgarian society and to protect their rights."[76] According to Andrew Vorkink, World Bank Country Director for Bulgaria, "The Government's goal of promoting the full inclusion of ethnic minorities in Bulgaria's society and economy is to the great economic and social benefit for those groups and for the country as a whole."[77] Although this is not a particularly large sum of money in absolute terms, the National Council of Ethnic and Demographic Issues serves as an example both of the development of civil society in post-totalitarian Bulgaria, and of the willingness of the political regime to move beyond the repression and discriminatory policies and practices of the past. These and similar measures certainly do not guarantee a continuation of the "ethnic peace" in Bulgaria, but the would seem to help foster conditions that Fearon/Laitin and Levine have identified as contributing to the de-escalation of potential conflicts.

Commenting on Ali Eminov's recent book on the Turks in Bulgaria,[78] Linda Nelson perhaps reflected the situation most succinctly:

> [T]he situation in the post-communist period is mixed. The Muslim population has for the most part reclaimed their cultural and civil rights without armed conflict under the leadership of the Movement for Rights and Freedom, which stresses cooperation and consensus. However, *tensions remain just below the surface as Bulgarian nationalists continue to use Turks and other Muslims as scapegoats for the social, political, and economic problems of the transition to a democratic society*.[79] (Emphasis added.)

It remains to be seen whether this "surface" will prove to be a democratic safeguard within which a tolerant, prosperous, and healthy civil society can grow—or whether that surface will prove to be a futile lid imposed on a cauldron whose forces of conflict cannot be contained. Fortunately, the evidence of the first decade after the

collapse of the communist regime of Zhivkov points toward the former.

The parliamentary elections of 18 June 2001 brought the MRF 21 parliamentary seats, and positioned it to be included in a coalition government with the National Movement (NDTS), as shown in Table B1, below. This situation would appear to corroborate the general conclusions of this article, that a general ethnic peace has prevailed in post-Zhivkov Bulgaria. To the extent that such a peace is a reflection of the underlying social conditions as outlined in this article, the entry of the MRF into a national governing coalition, and its largely harmonious functioning since the coalition's formation, may bode particularly well for the furtherance of national unity despite the presence of strong communal (ethnic-based) particularity. Other interpretations are certainly possible, and much remains uncertain over the long term. However, perhaps the changes in the electoral landscape do reflect an ethnic peace that has *both* deepened itself well below the surface of Bulgarian society and extended itself to the height of national government.

Appendix A. Recent Presidential Elections in Bulgaria

TABLE A1
Presidential election, 11 and 18 November 2001 (voter turnout: 39.2 and 54.4%, respectively)

Candidate	%	%
Georgi Parvanov (Balgarska Socialističeska Partija)	36.4	54.1
Petar Stefanov Stojanov	34.9	45.9
Boromil Bonev (Graždanska Partija za Balgarija)	19.3	—
Reneta Indžova (Demokratičen Alians)	4.9	—
Žorž Gančev (Blokat na Žorž Gančev)	3.4	—
Petar Beron (Sajuz Balgarija)	1.1	—

Source: http://www.electionworld.org/bulgaria.htm

TABLE A2
Presidential election, 27 October and 3 November 1996

Candidate	%	%
Petar Stefanov Stojanov (Sayuz na Demokratichnite Sili)	44.1	59.7
Ivan Mazarov (Balgarska Socialističeska Partija)	27.0	40.3
Georges Gančev (Bulgarski Biznes Blok)	21.9	—
Others	4.6	—

Source: OMRI.

Appendix B. Recent Parliamentary Elections in Bulgaria

Parliament
The *Narodno Sabranie* (National Assembly) has 240 members, elected for a four-year term by proportional representation in multi-seat constituencies with a 4% barrier.

TABLE B1
Parliamentary elections, 18 June 2001 (voter turnout 66.7 %)

Party group	%	Seats
Nacionalno Dviženie Simeon Tvori (National Movement Simeon the Second, personalist) NDST	42.7	120
Obedineni Demokratični Sili (United Democratic Forces) ODS	18.2	51
—Sajuz na Demokratičnite Sili (Union of Democratic Forces, conservative)		
—Demokratičeska Partija (Democratic Party, conservative)		
—Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sajuz-NS (Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union-PU, agrarian)		
—Balgarska Socialna Demokratičeska Partija (Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, social-democratic)		
—Nacionalno Demokratičeska Partija (National Democratic Party)		
Koalicija za Balgarija (Coalition for Bulgaria) KzB	17.1	48
—Balgarska Socialističeska Partija (Bulgarian Socialist Party, socialist)		
—Balgarska Socialdemokratičeska Partija (Bulgarian Social Democratic Party)		
—Obedinen Blok na Truda (United Labour Bloc)		
—Političesko Dviženie "Socialdemokrati" (Political Movement "Social Democrats")		
—Balgarski Zemedelski Sajuz "Aleksander Stambolijski 1899" (Bulgarian Agrarian Union "Alexander Stamboliyski 1899")		
—Demokratičen Sajuz na ženite (Women's Democratic Union)		
—Otečestven Sajuz/Sajuz na Otečestvoto (Fatherland Union)		
—Balgarski Antifašistki Sajuz (Bulgarian Anti-Fascist Union)		
—Dvišenie "Napred Balgarija" (Movement "Forward, Bulgaria")		
—Obšonapoden Komitet za Zašita na Nacionalite Interesi (All People Committee for Protection of the National Interests)		
—Graždansko Obedinenie "Roma"(Civil Union "Roma")		
—Konfederacija na Romite "Evropa" (Confederation of Romas "Europe")		
—Alians za Socialliberalen Progres (Alliance for Social Liberal Progress)		
—Komunističeska Partija na Balgarija (Communist Party of Bulgaria)		
—Političeski Klub "Trakija" (Political Club "Trakija")		
—Nacionalno Sdruženie "Obedineni Balharski Graždani" (National Association "United Bulgarian Citizens")		
Dviženie za Pravata i Svobodie (Movement for Rights and Freedoms) DPS	7.5	21
—Dviženie za Pravata i Svobodie (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, liberal Turkish minority)		
—Liberalen Sajuz (Liberal Union, liberal)		
—Evroroma (Euroroma, Roma minority)		

Gergiovden-VMRO G-VMRO	3.6	–
—Dviženie Gergiovden (Saint George Day Movement, conservative)		
—Vnatrešno-Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization)		
Koalicija Simeon II (Coalition Simeon II) KSII	3.4	–
Nacionalno Obedenenie za Car Simeon II (National Union for Tzar Simeon II) NOCS	1.1	–
Balgarska Evrolevica-BESDP-BZNS BEL	1.0	–
—Balgarska Evrolevica (Bulgarian Euroleft, social-democratic)		
—BESDP Obedineni Socialdemokrati (BESDP United Social-Democrats, social-democratic)		
—Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sajuz (Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union, agrarian)		
Sajuz Balgarija (Union Bulgaria)	0.7	–
Koalicija Nacionalno Obedenenie Car Kiro (Coalition National Union Tzar Kiro)	0.6	–

Source: Centralna Izbiratelna Komisija, http://www.electionworld.org/bulgaria.htm

TABLE B2
Parliamentary elections, 19 April 1997 (voter turnout 67.5 %)

Party group	%	Seats
Obedineni demokratični sili (United Democratic Forces), Sajuz na Demokratičnite Sili (Union of Democratic Forces, conservative), Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sajuz (Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union, agrarian), Demokratičeska Partija (Democratic Party, conservative), Balgarska Socialna Demokratičeska Partija (Bulgarian Social Democratic Party, social-democratic) ODS	52.2	137
Demokratičnata Levica (Democratic Left), Balgarska Socialističeska Partija (Bulgarian Socialist Party, extreme left), Dvišenie Ekoglasnost (Ecoglasnost Movement, ecologist), Balgarski Zemedelski Naroden Sajuz—Aleksander Stambolijski (Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union—Alexander Stamboliyski, agrarian) DL	22.0	58
Obedinenie za Nacionalno Spasenie (Union for National Salvation), Dvišenie za Pravata i Svobodie (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, Turkish minority), Zelena Partija (Green Party, ecologist), Sajuz Nov Izbor (Union New Choice, liberal) ONS	7.6	19
Koalicija Evrolevica (Coalition Euro-Left, social-democratic) EL	5.6	14
Balgarski Biznes Blok (Bulgarian Business Block, nationalist) BBB	4.9	12
Balgarska Komunističeska Partija (Bulgarian Communist Party, communist) BKP	1.2	–
Obedenenie za Carja (Union for the Monarchy) OC	1.1	–

Source: http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/election/bulgaria.htm.

NOTES

* Special thanks to Christine Anuszeuwski for editorial assistance.

1. Wolfgang Hoepken, "From Religious Identity to Ethnic Mobilisation: The Turks of Bulgaria before, under, and since Communism," in Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, eds, *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State* (London: C. Hurst, 1997), p. 78.
2. Rossen Vassilev, "Bulgaria's Ethnic Problems," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2002, p. 123.
3. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 90, No. 4, 1996, pp. 715–735.
4. *Ibid*., p. 715.
5. Robert Tedd Gurr, "Ethnic Warfare on the Wane?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3, 2000, pp. 52–64. In 1999, there were 23 de-escalating ethnic conflicts, 29 remaining constant, and seven escalating (p. 54).
6. *Ibid*., p. 55. See also, by the same author, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington: U.S. Institute for Peace, 1993).
7. Victor T. Levine, "Conceptualizing Ethnicity," *Studies in International Development*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1997, p. 51.
8. See in particular Clifford Geertz, "The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1963); also by the same author, *The Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Ernst Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1983); and Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
9. Walker Connor, "Beyond Reason: The Nature of the Ethnonational Bond," in *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1993, pp. 373–389.
10. The policy of Serbia's Slobodan Milosevic would seem to exemplify this type of ethnic-based conflict. For a recent examination of this type of politically opportunistic use of "ethnology", see Victor Shnirelman, *Who Gets the Past? Competition for Ancestors among Non-Russian Intellectuals in Russia* (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996).
11. According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, the population figures (in thousands) are: 1996: 8,384; 1997: 8,340; 1998: 9,283.2. Source: http://www.nsi.bg/Stat_e/statistics.htm; the 2003 estimate is from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107365.html.
12. This information was obtained in February 2003 from http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107365.html.
13. Pockets of ethnic Turks are to be found throughout the Balkan peninsula, a natural consequence, perhaps, of the centuries-old Ottoman rule over much of this territory. Even as far west as Kosova there exists a Turkish minority that is significant in terms of electoral politics; see Patrick Moore, "Different Issues, Different Priorities in Balkan Elections," *RFE-RL Report*, September 8, 2000. See also Ali Eminov, "Turks and Tatars in Bulgaria and the Balkans," *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2000, p. 139.
14. As Hugh Poulton noted a decade ago, the disparity represented a double concern for Bulgarian authorities, since the minority population was increasing much faster than that of the ethnic Bulgarians, and the southern, agricultural regions of the country were increasingly populated predominantly by various minorities. Awareness of this disparity may have contributed directly to the "Bulgarization" campaign of 1984–1985. *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict* (London: Minority Rights, 1991), p. 123.
15. *Ibid*., p. 105. For a regional and city-by-city breakdown of the proportion of Turks in Bulgaria from 1880 to 1910, see R. J. Crampton, "The Turks in Bulgaria, 1878–1944," in

Kemal Karpat, ed., *The Turks of Bulgaria: The History of Culture, and Political Fate of a Minority* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990), pp. 71–78.

16. A succinct but good overview of Bulgarian history may be found in J. William Derleth, *The Transition in Central and Eastern European Politics* (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2000), pp. 122–142; a useful timeline of Bulgaria from 1944–1998 is found on pp. 184–187 of that volume.
17. Hugh Poulton, "Islam, Ethnicity, and State in the Contemporary Balkans," in Hugh Poulton and Suha Taji-Farouki, eds, *Muslim Identity and the Balkan State* (Washington Square, NY: New York University Press, 1997), pp. 16–17. See also Talip Kucukcan, "Re-claiming Identity: Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics among Turkish-Muslims in Bulgaria and Greece," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1999, p. 52.
18. *Ibid*., p. 17. However, as pointed out by Fearon and Laitin (1996), p. 731, the *millet* system was not successful everywhere, and

> over time the millet and kahal systems broke down, with awful consequences for all groups but especially for minorities. *It is crucial that both spiral equilibria and in-group policing will tend to reproduce and maintain the sense of ethnic difference through time.* In addition, in-group policing may have the added liability that the same in-group institutions that prevent spiraling may be captured by ethnic entrepreneurs with an interest in fomenting ethnic violence and used by them to mobilize ethnic groups for conflict.

Fortunately, and likely for a number of reasons, that liability has not materialized in post-communist Bulgaria. The question, explored below, is why.

19. Eminov, p. 131.
20. For detailed historical accounts of this period, see R. J. Crampton, *Bulgaria 1878–1918: A History* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1983), and "The Turks in Bulgaria, 1878–1944," in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture, and Political Fate of a Minority* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990), pp. 43–78.
21. See, for example, Kemal H. Karpat, "Introduction: Bulgarian Way of Nation Building and the Turkish Minority," in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture, and Political Fate of a Minority* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1990), pp. 1–22.
22. Antonina Zhelyazkova, "The Social and Cultural Adaptation of the Bulgarian Emigrants in Turkey," in Antonina Zhelyazkova, ed., *From Adaptation to Nostalgia: The Bulgarian Turks in Turkey* (Sofia: International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, 1998), p. 6.
23. See Wolfgang Hoepken (1997), pp. 60–62.
24. Zhelyazkova, "Social and Cultural Adaptation of the Bulgarian Emigrants into Turkey," p. 13.
25. Bilal Simsir, a "noted Turkish historian," as referred to by Mujeeb Khan, "View I" (Review Articles: "From the Balkans," "Two Books," "Two Reviews," and "Different Views"), *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1999, p. 330.
26. See in particular Eminov, *op. cit.* Also, Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Minorities of Bulgaria* (London: Routledge, 1997).
27. This is not to minimize the highly significant role that religion plays in the complex web of society and politics in Bulgaria, as it does elsewhere. Sociological data from the middle of the 1980s indicated that ethnic Turks were considerably more religiously inclined than ethnic Bulgarians; Poulton, *The Balkans*, pp. 125–126.
28. In particular, Juan L. Linz and Alfred Stepan (*Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*

[Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996]) consider Bulgaria to have been at or near the extreme totalitarian end of the political spectrum as late as 1988 "concerning autonomous groups in society" (p. 294).

29. Nissan Oren, *Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power 1933–1944* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 259. See also Joseph Rothschild, *The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).
30. Graham Smith, "Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev," in Graham Smith, ed., *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union* (London: Longman, 1990), pp. 1–20, provides a succinct view of the nationality question; for background on the historical roots and ideology, see the collection of essays in Part 1, "History and Ideology," of Rachel Denber, ed., *The Soviet Nationality Reader* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 11–101.
31. P. H. Fedoseev *et al., Leninizm I Natsional'niyi Vopros V Sovremmenom Uslovyak* (Moscow: Politicheskaya Literatura, 1974), Chapter 9.
32. Georgi Fotev, *Ethnicity, Religion, and Politics* (Sofia: Marin Drinov and Pensoft, 1999), p. 37. Translation provided by Orlina Boteva.
33. Cited from Poulton, *The Balkans*, p. 120.
34. Zhelyazkova, Chapter 1: "The Fate of the Turks in Bulgaria from 1878 to 1989," pp. 16–17.
35. Poulton, *The Balkans*, pp. 119–120.
36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid*., pp. 111–115. According to Poulton: more recently, "[h]owever, there appears to be less problems between Pomaks and Bulgarians than the case with Turks and Bulgarians" (p. 115).
38. For an excellent overview of the period from the beginning of the 1984–1985 campaign until the mass exodus of Turks from Bulgaria in 1989, see Poulton, *The Balkans*, Chapters 10, "Bulgaria's Ethnic Turks—Forced Assimilation from 1984–1989" (pp. 129–151), and 11, "Bulgaria's Ethnic Turks—Mass Exodus in 1989" (pp. 153–161).
39. Zhelyazkova, "The Fate of the Turks in Bulgaria from 1878 to 1989," in *Social and Cultural Adaptation of the Bulgarian Emigrants into Turkey*, p. 15:

    > By some way of compensation for the eliminated religions and related everyday life traditions and rituals, the government followed the ideological cliches of "internationalism" and granted greater freedom of expression to the various ethnic groups with their respective cultures. These astonishing acts of tolerance, particularly toward the Turkish ethnic identity, were linked with the absurd idea of "exporting the revolution" on a worldwide scale. In this particular case the Bulgarian authorities, pressured by the Soviet secret services, took up the task of winning the confidence of the Turkish population and training the specialists required for exporting the communist ideology to Turkey. The very way of transferring the revolutionary cadres into Turkish territory was considered extremely simple to achieve—through conducting periodic emigration campaigns among the Bulgarian Turks.

40. Cited in "Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Expulsion of the Bulgarian Turks," *Helsinki Watch*, October 1989, p. 1.
41. The Nazi concept and practice of *Gleichschaltung*, or coordination ("bringing into line"), was central to the totalitarian project of social and cultural reconstruction, which in turn was central to the entire Nazi political vision.
42. Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria* (New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 91–99.

43. Cited in Linz and Stepan, p. 336.
44. *Ibid*., p. 335.
45. Zhelyazkova, "The Turks in the Transitional Period from 1990–1997," in *Between Adaptation and Nostalgia*, p. 23.
46. *Ibid.*
47. "Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Expulsion of the Bulgarian Turks," *Helsinki Watch*. The report views the anti-Turk campaign of May 1989 as a particularly intense continuation of the regime's general orientation toward the Turkish minority at least since the 1984–1985 assimilation campaign, and in some respects emblematic of the overall experience of the Turkish minority. The report notes curtly that "Bulgaria has a long established policy of attempting to destroy the identity of the Turks."
48. Antonina Zhelyazkova, "The Fate of the Turks in Bulgaria from 1878 to 1989," in Antonina Zhelyazkova, ed., *Between Adaptation and Nostalgia: The Bulgarian Turks in Turkey* (Sofia: International Center for Problems of Minorities and Cultural Interaction).
49. Eminov, *Turkish and Other Minorities of Bulgaria*, pp. 164–165. See also his "Epilogue," same volume, pp. 176–178.
50. Cited in Eminov, "Turks and Tatars in Bulgaria and the Balkans," p. 142.
51. This information was derived from http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/bulgaria.htm.
52. Margarita Assenova, "Bulgaria: The Rush to Build Coalitions," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline*, 6 February 2001.
53. Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria*, pp. 172–173.
54. Hoepken, pp. 80–81.
55. Figures from the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute reflect these realities, and may be found at http://www.nsi.bg/Stat_e/statistics.htm.
56. The interview was conducted and translated by Orlina Boteva.
57. *Ibid.*
58. The U.S. Department of State's *Human Rights Report for 1999: Bulgaria* (Washington: Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2000), for example, notes "high levels of discrimination" against the Roma but not against the Turkish minority. It does note, however, that "[t]here are no restrictions on speaking Turkish in public or the use of non-Slavic names" (p. 20); that government-funded, voluntary Turkish-language classes are offered in public schools (p. 20); and that although the government is attempting to correct the previously rampant discrimination in the military (pp. 21–22), "there are only a few ethnic Turkish, Pomak, and Romani officers in the military, and an insignificant number of high-ranking officers of the Muslim faith" (pp. 21–22).
59. Ted Robert Gurr, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethno-political Conflicts* (Washington: U.S. Institute for Peace, 1993), pp. 46–47. See also Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
60. U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights Report for 1999: Bulgaria*, p. 22.
61. *Ibid*., pp. 204–205.
62. The more or less persisting opportunity to emigrate may account, at least in part, for the apparent absence of a push for an autonomous regime for the Turks in Bulgaria. Also, the relatively small population of Turks in Bulgaria would make secession an unlikely scenario, especially given the presence of Turkey neighboring so closely, and given the relatively open borders for emigration that have existed since Bulgaria's independence was won in 1878. Such autonomy arrangements are difficult to make work in practice, and particularly under circumstances of serious discrepancy among ethnic groups. Ruth Lapidoth, *Autonomy: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington: U.S. Institute for Peace, 1996), pp. 200–201. See also Gidon Gottlieb, *Nation against State: A New*

Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline of Sovereignty (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993). See also Ivanka Nedeva Atanassova, "The Impact of Ethnic Issues on the Security of South Eastern Europe," *Report Commissioned by the NATO Office of Information and Press* (June 1999), especially Section 5.1, "The Question of Status."

63. Perhaps in this case the distinctively different cultural–religious roots of each group may have been deliberately tolerated, perhaps even valued, by the other as a means of overcoming the larger threat to their common civilization. This is consistent with the findings of Jonathan Fox that the "clash of civilizations" thesis of Samuel Huntington (*Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, pp. 22–29, and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* [New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996]) that "civilizational conflicts constitute a minority of ethnic conflicts" and that "there is no evidence that the intensity of civilizational conflicts have risen relative to other types of ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War." Jonathan Fox, "Ethnic Minorities and the Clash of Civilizations: A Quantitative Analysis of Huntington's Thesis," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 32, No. 3, 2002, p. 415.
64. Victor Levine's imagery of the three stages of worst-case-scenario ethnic conflict conceives of such conflict as having gone from an "incipient phase" to an "open phase" of overt conflict, and then, if not corrected or harnessed somehow, to an "out of control" phase characterized by widespread and self-perpetuating violence; Levine, pp. 45–75.
65. Bulgaria's post-communist political psychology may bear certain comparisons to Canada's non-violent, step-by-step approach to a political resolution of the status of Quebec. To be sure, the substantive issues are markedly different, but the underlying political psychology appears similar enough to warrant further in-depth comparative studies.
66. Fearon and Laitin, p. 715.
67. *Ibid*., p. 729.
68. Jolyon Naegele, "Turkey: Foreign Relations Good with Two of Eight Neighbors," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 18 August 2000; located at www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/08/F.RU.980813130211.html.
69. Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 146–162.
70. *Annual Report on the State of the National Security of the Republic of Bulgaria in 1999* (Sofia, 1999), particularly Section 3, "Degree of Protection of the National Interests;" this document is available at www.government.bg/eng/oficial_docs/reports/National_Sec_Report.htm.
71. Derleth (2000) however, asserts that "Five hundred years of foreign domination have made Bulgarians politically apathetic. They view politics as something distant, outside their control. As a result, in contrast to Hungarians and Poles they tend to be much more politically lethargic." His conclusion is that "the result is a somewhat intolerant political culture, a severely divided and polarized society, a conservative populace, and the lack of an agreed-upon foundation on which to construct the polity. Thus, the political culture presents numerous obstacles to change in the contemporary period" (pp. 145–146).
72. *Ibid*., p. 715.
73. For a cogent overview of major works dealing with these themes, see Nicolai Petro, "Creating Social Capital in Russia: The Novgorod Model," *World Development*, Vol. 29, Spring 2001, pp. 229–244.
74. "Bulgarian State to Air News in Turkish," *AP Worldstream* (COMTEX), 1 October 2000.
75. U.S. Department of State, *Human Rights Report for 1999: Bulgaria*, p. 20. On 3

November 2000, a conference of Bulgarian Muslims was held in Sofia to deal, among other things, with issues of relations among various groups in Bulgarian society. 'Bulgaristan Müslümanlari Ulusal Konferansi Sofya'da yapildi', *Zaman*, 3 November 2000, p. 1.

76. "The World Bank Supports the Integration of Ethnic Minorities," World Bank, Press Office, 22 June 2000. Document located at www.worldbank.bg/press/2000-12-eccbg.phtml.
77. *Ibid.* As further evidence that the national government is genuinely interested in improving the material living conditions of minorities, the Minister of Health is reported to have "asked the [World] Bank team managing the Health Sector Restructuring Project to modify the primary health care component of this project to direct the intervention more toward the rural and remote areas of the country, thereby targeting the project more to the poor" (www.worldbank.org/infoshop, Report PID8734). Given the demographic realities of contemporary Bulgaria, there is little question that the Turks and other minorities would be the beneficiaries of this intervention.
78. Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria.*
79. Linda Nelson, reviewing Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria* (New York: Routledge, 1997), in the *Bulgarian Studies Association Newsletter*, Vol. 30, No. 2, 2000, p. 7.